Understanding Why the Iranian Protest Movement Stalled
Almost a year since the murder of Mahsa Jina Amini, it is clear that the protest movement her death sparked is, at the current moment, not an existential threat for the Islamic Republic. In hindsight, it may seem obvious that the protests were not going to coalesce into a bid for power – but this was not self-evident during the movement’s peak. It may be difficult to recall now, but the political atmosphere (both in Iran and the diaspora) was brimming with potential. After all, the movement’s adversaries in the Islamic Republic are not particularly dynamic and effective. The IRI’s current leadership stands out for its ineffective management, shortsightedness, and overall low human capital. The fundamental intellectual challenge of Iranian politics is not trying to develop a vision for overcoming this leadership – but rather answering how it is that this current insular clique, a thin shell of the original 1979 revolutionary coalition, has so successfully totalized political power.
In some ways, the IRI has emerged from the movement more powerful than before. The movement’s main tangible accomplishment is a decline in hijab compliance, mostly in Tehran. The return of hijab enforcement patrols (‘guidance patrols’ or gasht-e ershad) signals that even these gains are not secure. More so, each protest cycle has resulted in additional layers of Iranian society self-purging from political life, through immigration and by publicly aligning as anti-IRI in a manner that vetoes any future political participation. These outcomes reinforce political abstentionism, apathy, and hopelessness.
In understanding this outcome, it is worthwhile to consider some fundamental weaknesses that plagued the Mahsa movement, both in Iran and the diaspora. In a series of posts, I hope to explore some of these problems – with the goal of maybe illuminating a way out of the current impasse.
Problem #1: A lack of strategic orientation
Imagine some diaspora Iranians form a political organization dedicated to establishing a democratic Iran. Now, consider the various strategic forks-in-the-road which can emerge as this organization moves forward. Should it be legally established as a party or an NGO? In what country? Should it recruit from inside Iran or the diaspora?
Now imagine that it raises a significant amount of money. Should that money be spent on a new independent satellite channel? Or spent on a strike fund for workers in Iran?
Fast-forward several steps, imagine this group somehow liberates a border province in Iran. Should it seek international recognition as an independent country or push to liberate the rest of Iran? Which classes and groups inside the territory should it align with, considering its scarce resources?
A common attribute to all these hypothetical strategic forks-in-the-road is that both sides to any hypothetical can raise legitimate points. Either side can offer a reasonable causal link between their preferred path and the final goal of a democratic Iran.
Now, consider the protest movement as it currently exists in the diaspora. Ask someone protesting NIAC or a cancer charity in New York as to the causal link between their actions and establishing a democratic Iran. You may be attacked as a regime apologist; but you are unlikely to hear an answer that offers a reasonable strategic explanation. What are the causal links between defeating the IRI in order to establish a democratic Iran and any of the following activities: selling Zan-Zendegi-Azadi merchandise, holding die-ins in front of the White House, going topless in front of mosques, launching hashtag campaigns, naming menu items after Mahsa Amini, raising the Pahlavi flag in Barrie, Ontario, lobbying foreign governments to cut diplomatic ties with Iran, Zan-Zendegi-Azadi OnlyFans accounts, Mahsa murals in Berlin, removing Iran from UN committees, protesting lectures by anti-sanctions academics, campaigning against Team Melli friendlies, and so on…
While some of the above could be cultural outcomes downstream from an active political mobilization, these activities are currently the core of what diaspora activists are spending their bandwidth on. Considering the massive influence that the diaspora holds over Iranians, this is disastrous for any anti-IRI mobilization.
What explains this? Why are so many otherwise talented and smart diasporans exerting energy on activities that have little to no causal relationship to taking power in Iran? People aren’t stupid – but their goals may be different from what you imagine. While the above activities make no sense if measured vis-à-vis power inside Iran, they make a lot of sense if your goal is financial, cultural, or social capital in the West. The animosity diaspora activists may feel towards the IRI is undoubtedly genuine, but the movement is increasingly centered on the local self-interest of these activists rather than any attempt at mobilizing to contest power in Iran. The movement’s leadership is comprised almost exclusively of three types of individuals: figures from creative industries like art, music, and film; figures from the NGO-academia world of professional activism; or various policy-advocacy types from a constellation of neoconservative outfits.
For the most part, these individuals would not materially benefit much from defeating the IRI, as their opposition is fundamentally moral and ideological. Many don’t even pretend to have an interest in moving to Iran, let alone taking up positions of power post-revolution.1 But they all have a shared material interest in the ongoing cultural and media salience of Iran. Keeping Iran trending is undeniably good for their day-jobs.
This explains this heavy singular emphasis on maintaining the media’s focus on the Iranian protests. If there existed even remotely a deterministic relationship between global attention/condemnation and political outcomes, the IRI would have collapsed a dozen times over by now. Despite this, the opposition’s leading figures continue to prioritize media attention – that despite ineffective in harming the IRI, just happens to be very effective in propelling their careers forward. It is an uncomfortable truth, but the reality is that the more blood spilled on the streets on the Iran, the shiner their grant applications, higher their book sales, and more numerous their interview requests.
The remoteness of these individuals from contesting political power in Iran is clear when assessing their priorities. They are willing to spill all the ink and tears in the world over more US sanctions on Iran – a strategy that even sanctions proponents concede has no material impact. While the American sanctions regime has successfully blocked Iranian development, its success also means that the US has little further leverage over the IRI. But what pursuing more US sanctions lacks in strategic soundness, it makes up for by being a great career move by providing access to the halls of power.
If their advocacy for sanctions was about power in Iran and not about their own careers, we would expect to see some attempt at creating friction between the IRI and its actual external lifelines like China2 and Turkey. And yet, nothing. It is unlikely that a serious movement dedicated to overthrowing the IRI would somehow overlook the countries with the largest bilateral trade with Iran.
Of course, the reason for this omission is obvious. The movement’s self-appointed leaders live in the West, as do their audiences, fans, and sponsors. While a Chinese-language campaign to denigrate the IRI may succeed in making the Islamic Republic more unpopular among Chinese elites than it already is (with valuable consequences for a serious opposition), it would do little to boost the careers of the diaspora’s professional activists.
While this is just one example, it is imperative that those opposed to the IRI develop a habit of strategic thinking. If someone suggests a particular action, campaign, or petition; it is important to think about how it causally relates to power in Iran. Any proposal needs to explain how it can relates to the end goal and its likelihood of success. As long as the movement is limited to moralist thinking, it remains prone to being misled by the current roster of grifters and neocons. Simply being opposed to the IRI does not make an action right – it needs to be causally and logically connected to some end goal. Simply asking these questions and adopting this frame of mind will go a long way to developing a movement that can one day challenge the IRI for power in Iran.
Reza Pahlavi is the most notable exception here. Despite his obvious and fatal shortcomings, it partially explains why he stands head and shoulders above other opposition figures.
It is frivolously easy to argue why focusing on China is more effective than advocating for even more US sanctions on Iran. The gap between the strategic importance of China and the US for the IRI is so large that even a slight probability of throwing some sand in Iran-China relations is exponentially more strategically valuable than further US pressure on Iran. Anyone whose understanding of Chinese politics does not come exclusively from Twitter or Fox News will understand that the CCP’s relationship vis-à-vis feminism and Islamism does not bode entirely well for the Islamic Republic. Again, this strategically does not require any alignment with the CCP, but is simply a basic realpolitik strategic assessment.